Abstract. Hopper and Blum (Asiacrypt 2001) and Juels and Weis (Crypto 2005) recently proposed two shared-key authentication protocols-HB and HB + , respectivelywhose extremely low computational cost makes them attractive for low-cost devices such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags. The security of these protocols is based on the conjectured hardness of the "learning parity with noise" (LPN) problem, which is equivalent to the problem of decoding random binary linear codes. The HB protocol is proven secure against a passive (eavesdropping) adversary, while the HB + protocol is proven secure against active attacks.
Introduction
Low-cost, resource-constrained devices such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags or sensor nodes demand extremely efficient algorithms and protocols. Securing such devices is a challenge since, in many cases, "traditional" cryptographic protocols are simply too computationally intensive to be utilized. With this motivation in mind, Juels and Weis [25] -building upon work of Hopper and Blum [21, 22] -investigate two highly efficient, shared-key (unidirectional) authentication protocols suitable for an RFID tag identifying itself to a tag reader. (We will sometimes refer to the tag as a prover and the tag reader as a verifier.) These protocols are extremely lightweight, requiring both parties to perform only a relatively small number of primitive bit-wise operations such as "XOR" and "AND," and can thus be implemented using fewer than the 3-5 K gates required to implement a block cipher such as DES or AES [25] .
The two authentication protocols studied by Juels and Weis are both proven secure based on the "learning parity with noise" (LPN) problem [2] [3] [4] 8, [20] [21] [22] 28, 37] , which is related to the hardness of decoding a random linear code; a formal definition of the LPN problem as well as evidence for its difficulty are reviewed in Sect. 2.1. The first protocol (the HB protocol [21, 22] ) is proven secure against a passive (eavesdropping) adversary, while the second (called HB + ) is proven secure against the stronger class of active adversaries. In each case, Juels and Weis focus on a single, "basic authentication step" of the protocol, and prove that a computationally bounded adversary cannot succeed in impersonating a tag in this case with probability noticeably better than 1/2; that is, a single iteration of the protocol has soundness error 1/2. The implicit assumption is that repeating these "basic authentication steps" sufficiently many times yields a protocol with negligible soundness error.
Difficulties and Limitations
There are, however, some subtle limitations of the security proofs given by Juels and Weis. Most serious, perhaps, is a difficulty explicitly highlighted by Juels and Weis and regarded by them as a potential barrier to usage of the HB + protocol in practice [25, Sect. 6] : the proof of security for HB + requires that the adversary's interactions with the tag (i.e., when the adversary is impersonating a tag reader) be sequential. Besides leaving in question the security of HB + under concurrent executions, this also means that the HB + protocol itself (which, recall, consists of sufficiently many repetitions of an underlying basic authentication step) requires very high round complexity since the multiple iterations of the basic authentication step cannot be parallelized but must instead be performed sequentially. The difficulty and importance of proving security of various identification protocols under concurrent or parallel composition is wellunderstood, and many results are known: for example, the (black-box) zero-knowledge property of an identification protocol is not preserved under parallel [16] or concurrent [6] composition (though it is preserved under sequential composition [17] ), whereas witness indistinguishability is preserved in these cases [10] . Unfortunately, the HB + protocol is not known to satisfy either zero knowledge or witness indistinguishability and so such results are of no help here.
An additional difficulty, not explicitly mentioned in [25] , is that it is unclear what is the exact relationship between the soundness error and the number of repetitions of the basic authentication step; this is true for both the HB and HB + protocols, regardless of whether the repetitions are carried out in parallel or sequentially. 1 This is related to the more general question of hardness amplification (i.e., analyzing the difficulty of solving multiple instances of a problem compared to the difficulty of solving a single such instance) which has been studied in many different contexts [1, 7, 15, 18, 36, 38] and is surprisingly non-trivial to answer. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any prior work that applies in our setting. Specifically:
• For the HB and HB + protocols it is not possible to efficiently verify whether a given transcript is "successful" without possession of the secret key; thus, Yao's "XOR-lemma" [18, 38] and related techniques that require efficient verifiability do not apply.
• Work on hardness amplification for "weakly verifiable puzzles" [7] does not apply either. Although the HB/HB + protocols can be viewed as efficiently verifiable puzzles, existing results [7] only apply to completely independent instances of the "puzzle." In particular, existing results imply that running the basic authentication step of the HB protocol n times using n independent keys yields soundness roughly (1/2) n , but say nothing about running n iterations using the same key (which is the case we are interested in).
• The HB/HB + protocols are computationally sound only, and thus known results [15, Appendix C], [36] on soundness reduction for interactive proof systems (which apply only when soundness holds even against an all-powerful cheating prover) do not apply either.
• Limited positive results regarding soundness reduction for computationally sound protocols exist [1, 34] , but these results apply only when the verifier does not hold a secret key (or, more generally, when the verifier does not share state across different iterations). These results are therefore of no help when the same secret key is used across all iterations.
An additional difficulty in our setting is that HB and HB + protocols do not have perfect completeness; indeed, crucial to both the HB and HB + protocols is that the honest prover injects "noise" into its answers and so even the honest prover does not succeed with probability 1. This was not explicitly addressed in the security proofs of [25] , either, and introduces additional complications.
Our Contributions
In this work, we address the difficulties and open questions mentioned above, and show the following results: (1) the HB + protocol remains secure under arbitrary concurrent interactions of the adversary with the honest prover/tag, and so in particular the iterations of the HB + protocol can be parallelized; furthermore, (2) our security proofs explicitly incorporate the dependence of the soundness error on the number of iterations as well as on the error introduced by the honest prover.
Besides the results themselves, we believe the techniques and proofs given here are of independent interest for future work on cryptographic applications of the LPN problem. The main technical tool we use is the fact [3, 37] that hardness of the LPN problem implies the pseudorandomness of a certain distribution. Using this, we give proofs which we believe are substantially simpler than those given in [25] , and also more complete in that, in contrast to [25] , they explicitly deal with the dependence of soundness on the number of iterations and also the issues arising due to non-perfect completeness. Our proofs also use bounds from coding theory [19, 23, 24] in a novel way.
Additional Discussion
The problem of secure authentication using a shared, secret key is well understood, and many widely known solutions based on, e.g., block ciphers are available. The aim of the line of research considered here, as in [25] , is to develop protocols which are exceptionally efficient (i.e., potentially more efficient than hardware implementations of block ciphers such as DES or AES) while still guaranteeing some useful level of provable security. Of course, the protocols described here are far from solving the problem completely. For example, Gilbert, Robshaw, and Silbert [12] have recently shown a man-in-the-middle attack on the HB + protocol. Although their attack would be devastating if carried out successfully, the possibility of such an attack does not mean that it is useless to explore the security of the HB/HB + protocols in weaker attack models. For one, man-in-the-middle attacks can be difficult to carry out. Especially in the case of RFID, where communication is inherently short range, it appears much more difficult to mount a man-in-the-middle attack than an active attack. 2 (The reader is referred to the work of Wool et al. [29, 30] , for an illuminating discussion on the feasibility of various attacks in RFID systems.) Juels and Weis further note [25, Appendix A] that the man-in-the-middle attack of [12] does not apply in a detection-based system where numerous failed authentication attempts immediately raise an alarm. Our work can thus be viewed as quantifying more precisely the tradeoff between efficiency and privacy provided by the HB/HB + protocols.
Beyond our concrete results, we also hope that the techniques introduced in this paper will prove useful in analyzing future variants of the HB/HB + protocols, as well as other protocols based on the LPN problem.
Definitions and Preliminaries
We formally define the LPN problem and state and prove the main technical lemma on which we rely. We also describe the HB and HB + protocols as well as the notions of security considered here.
The LPN Problem
A function ε : N + → R + ∪ {0} is negligible if it is asymptotically smaller than any inverse polynomial, i.e., if for every polynomial p there exists a K such that k > K implies ε(k) ≤ 1/p(k). We use k for the security parameter, and let PPT stand for "probabilistic polynomial time". Let wt(Z) denote the Hamming weight of a boolean vector Z; i.e., wt(Z) is the number of entries of Z equal to 1. The Hamming distance between two vectors Z 1 , Z 2 is exactly wt(
If s, a 1 , . . . , a are binary vectors of the same length, s, a i denotes the dot product of s and a i (modulo 2). For s of length k, given the values a 1 , s, a 1 , . . . , a , s, a for random {a i } and = Θ(k), it is possible to efficiently solve for s (with all but negligible probability) using standard linear algebra. However, in the presence of noise where each z i is flipped (independently) with probability ε, finding s becomes much more difficult. We refer to the problem of learning s in this latter case as the LPN problem.
For the formal definition, let Ber ε be the Bernoulli distribution with parameter ε ∈ (0, 
and furthermore M runs in time at most t and makes at mostueries to its oracle. 3 In asymptotic terms, in the standard way, the LPN ε problem is "hard" if every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M solves the LPN ε problem with only negligible probability (where the algorithm's running time and success probability are functions of k).
The error parameter ε is usually taken to be a fixed constant independent of k, as will be the case here. The value of ε to use depends on a number of tradeoffs and design decisions: although, roughly speaking, the LPN ε problem appears to become "harder" as ε increases, a larger value of ε also implies that the honest prover is rejected more often (as will become clear when we describe the HB/HB + protocols, below). Our results are meaningful for all ε ∈ (0, The hardness of the LPN problem, both in the average case and the worst case, has been studied in many previous works. The LPN problem can be formulated as the problem of decoding a random linear code [2, 37] , and the worst-case version of this problem is N P-complete [2] as well as hard to approximate within a factor of 2 [20] . These worst-case hardness results are complemented by numerous studies of the average-case hardness of the problem [3, 4, 8, 21, 22, 28] . (Extensions of the LPN problem to fields other than Z 2 have also been considered [35, 37] .) Most relevant for our purposes is that the best known algorithms for solving the LPN ε problem [4, 11, 31] for any constant ε require t, q = 2 Θ(k/ log k) . (An algorithm due to Lyubashevsky [32] uses q = k 1+δ queries but has running time t = 2 Θ(k/δ log log k) .) We refer the reader to [25, Appendix D] and [11, 31] for more exact estimates, as well as suggested practical values for k.
A Technical Lemma
In this section, we prove a key technical lemma: hardness of the LPN ε problem implies "pseudorandomness" of A s,ε . Specifically, let U k+1 denote the uniform distribution on (k + 1)-bit strings. The following lemma shows that oracle access to A s,ε (for randomly chosen s) is indistinguishable from oracle access to U k+1 . A proof of the following is essentially in [3, 37] , although we have fleshed out some of the details and worked out the concrete parameters of the reduction.
Lemma 1. Say there exists an algorithm D making q oracle queries, running in time t, and with
Pr s ← {0, 1} k : D A s,ε 1 k = 1 − Pr D U k+1 1 k = 1 ≥ δ.
Then there exists an algorithm
, and such that
(We remark that various tradeoffs are possible between the number of queries/running time of M and its success probability in solving LPN ε ; see [37, Sect. 4] . We aimed for simplicity in the proof rather than trying to optimize parameters.)
1. M chooses random coins ω for D and uses these for the remainder of its execution. (1 k ; ω) a total of N times to compute an empirical estimate p for the probability (over responses of the oracle) that D outputs 1 in this case. 
. , s k ).
Let us analyze the behavior of M. First note that, by a standard averaging argument, with probability at least δ/2 over choice of s and random coins ω it holds that
where the probabilities are taken over the answers D receives from its oracle. We restrict our attention to s, ω for which (1) holds and show that in this case M outputs s = s with probability at least 1/2. The theorem follows.
except with probability at most 1/k. Next focus on a particular iteration i of steps 4(a) and 4(b). Letting hyb i denote the distribution of the answers returned to D in this iteration, we again have except with probability at most 1/3k. Applying a union bound, we see that (2) and (3) hold (the latter for all i ∈ [k]) with probability at least 1/2. We assume this to be the case for the rest of the proof, and show that when this occurs then M always outputs s = s.
. To see this note that when s i = 0 the answer (a j ⊕ (c j · e i ), z j ) returned to D is distributed exactly according to A s,ε since s, a j = s, a j ⊕ (c j · e i ) regardless of c j . On the other hand, if s i = 1 then s, a j (and hence z j ) is a random bit, independent of a j ⊕ (c j · e i ).
It follows that if
(by (1)), and so
8 (using (2) and (3)) and
and so |p i − p| ≤ 2 · δ 16 = δ 8 (again using (2) and (3)) and s i = 1 = s i . Since this holds for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we conclude that s = s.
The HB/HB + Protocols, and Security Definitions
Recall that we let k denote our security parameter. The HB and HB + protocols as analyzed here consist of n = n(k) parallel iterations of a "basic authentication step". In the HB protocol, a tag T and a reader R share a random secret key s ∈ {0, 1} k ; the basic authentication step consists of the reader sending a random challenge a ∈ {0, 1} k to the tag, which replies with z = s, a ⊕ ν for ν ∼ Ber ε . The reader can then verify whether the response z of the tag satisfies z ? = s, a ; we say the iteration is successful if this is the case. See Fig. 1 .
Even for an honest tag, a basic iteration is unsuccessful with probability ε. For this reason, a reader accepts upon completion of all n iterations of the basic authentication step as long as the number of unsuccessful iterations is not "too high". More precisely, let u = u(k) be such that ε · n ≤ u; then the reader accepts as long as the number of unsuccessful iterations is at most 5 u. (Overall, then, the entire HB protocol is parame-terized by ε, n, and u.) For an honest tag, each iteration is independent of the others and so the completeness error ε c (i.e., the probability that an honest tag is rejected) can be calculated using a Chernoff bound. In particular, for any positive constant δ, setting u = (1 + δ)εn suffices to achieve ε c exponentially small in n.
By sending random responses in each of the n iterations, an adversary trying to impersonate a valid tag succeeds with probability
that is, δ * ε,u,n is the best possible soundness error we can hope to achieve for the given setting of the parameters. Asymptotically, as long as u ≤ (1 − δ) · n/2 for some positive constant δ, the success of this trivial attack will be negligible in n. (This can again be analyzed using a Chernoff bound.) Let T HB s,ε,n denote the tag algorithm in the HB protocol when the tag holds secret key s (note that the tag algorithm is independent of u), and let R HB s,ε,u,n similarly denote the algorithm run by the tag reader. We denote a complete execution of the HB protocol between a partyT and the reader R by T , R HB s,ε,u,n and say this equals 1 iff the reader accepts.
For the case of a passive attack on the HB protocol, we imagine a stateful adversary A running in two stages: in the first stage, the adversary obtains polynomially many transcripts 6 of (honest) executions of the protocol by interacting with an oracle trans HB s,ε,n (this models eavesdropping); in the second stage, the adversary interacts with the reader and tries to impersonate the tag. We define the adversary's advantage as
The HB protocol is secure against passive attacks (for a particular setting of ε and u = u(k), n = n(k)) if for all PPT adversaries A we have that Adv
It is easy to see that the HB protocol is insecure against an active adversary. (For example, an active adversary impersonating R can send the same challenge vector a repeatedly and then, taking majority, learn the correct value of s, a with all but negligible probability; doing this for k linearly independent challenge vectors yields the entire secret s.) To achieve security against active attacks, Juels and Weis propose a modified protocol called HB + in which the tag and reader share two (independent) keys s 1 ∈ {0, 1} k and s 2 ∈ {0, 1} τ . (In practice, k must chosen such that the LPN problem is hard for secrets of length k, and τ < k is a statistical security parameter.) A basic authentication step now consists of three rounds: first the tag sends a random "blinding factor" b ∈ {0, 1} k ; the reader replies with a random challenge a ∈ {0, 1} τ ; and finally, the tag replies with z = s 1 , b ⊕ s 2 , a ⊕ ν for ν ← Ber ε . As in the HB protocol, the reader can verify whether the response z satisfies z ? = s 1 , b ⊕ s 2 , a , and we again say the iteration is successful if this is the case. See Fig. 2 . The actual HB + protocol consists of n parallel iterations of the basic authentication step (and so the entire protocol requires only three rounds). The protocol also depends upon a parameter u as in the case of the HB protocol, and this will again affect the completeness error as well as the best achievable soundness.
Let T HB + s 1 ,s 2 ,ε,n denote the tag algorithm in the HB + protocol when the tag holds keys s 1 , s 2 , and let R HB + s 1 ,s 2 ,ε,u,n denote the algorithm run by the tag reader. For the case of an active attack on the HB + protocol, we again imagine an adversary running in two stages: in the first stage the adversary interacts polynomially many times with the honest tag algorithm (with concurrent executions allowed), while in the second stage the adversary interacts only with the reader. The adversary's advantage in this case is
We say the HB + protocol is secure against active attacks (for a particular setting of ε and τ = τ (k), u = u(k), n = n(k)) if for all PPT adversaries A we have that
We remark that allowing the adversary to interact with the reader multiple times (even concurrently), in either the passive or active setting, does not give the adversary any additional advantage other than the fact that, as usual, the probability that the adversary succeeds in at least one impersonation attempt scales linearly with the number of attempts.
Security of the HB Protocol Against Passive Attacks
Recall from the previous section that the HB protocol is parameterized by ε (a measure of the noise introduced by the tag), u (which determines the completeness error ε c as well as the best achievable soundness), and n (the number of iterations of the basic authentication step given in Fig. 1 ). We stress that the n iterations are run in parallel, so the entire protocol requires only two rounds. A standard Chernoff bound shows that the completeness error is exponentially small for the given setting of the parameters. Therefore, we focus only on the security of the protocol against passive attacks. We deal first with the case ε < ε + < 1/4 since this case admits a significantly simpler analysis. We then show how to extend the proof to the case ε < 1/2. 
Claim 3. Say there exists an adversary A eavesdropping on at most q executions of the HB protocol, running in time t, and achieving Adv

) · n oracle queries, running in time O(t), and such that
Asymptotically, for any ε < ε + < 1 4 and n, u as in Theorem 2, the final two terms of the above expression are negligible. Thus, the claim together with Lemma 1 proves Theorem 2 for this case. (ā 1 , . . . ,ā n ) sent by D in the second phase. Then with probability at least δ it holds that Z and Z * differ in at most u entries (since A successfully impersonates the tag with this probability). Also, sinceZ is distributed exactly as the answers of an honest tag,Z and Z * differ in at most u positions except with probability at most ε c . It follows that with probability at least δ − ε c the vectors Z andZ differ in at most 2u entries, and so D outputs 1 with at least this probability.
We next consider the general case of ε < 1/2. The main difference in the proofs is as follows. Let d(Z 1 , Z 2 ) denote the Hamming distance between Z 1 , Z 2 . In the case of ε < 1/4, we use the fact that d(Z, Z * ) ≤ u and d(Z , Z * ) ≤ u imply d(Z, Z ) ≤ 2u in order to argue that with high probability D outputs 1 when its oracle is A s,ε . While this remains true for any choice of ε, the problem is that when ε ≥ 1/4 we have Pr[d(Z, Z ) ≤ 2u] ≈ 1 even when D's oracle is U k+1 . To prove the theorem when ε ≥ 1/4, we exploit the fact thatZ is not chosen adversarially within the ball of radius u around Z * , but is instead chosen by flipping each bit of Z * with probability ε. This allows us to show that, conditioned on d(Z , Z * ) ≤ u and choosingZ as described, d(Z, Z ) < n/2 with high probability. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix some PPT adversary
and so ε ++ in the desired range exists.) When D's oracle is U k+1 , it is clear that D outputs 1 with probability 2 −n · u i=0 n i sinceZ is in this case uniformly distributed and independent of everything else. Since u < n/2, this quantity is negligible in k for the given settings of the other parameters. When D's oracle is A s,ε then the transcripts D provides to A during the first phase of A's execution are distributed identically to real transcripts in an execution of the HB protocol. Letting Z * def = ( s,ā 1 , . . . , s,ā n ) be the vector of correct answers to the challenge (ā 1 , . . . ,ā n ) sent by D in the second phase, it follows that with probability δ (i.e., the impersonation probability of A) the vector of responses Z given by A differs from Z * in at most u entries. We show below that conditioned on this event, Z andZ differ in at most u entries with all but negligible probability. Thus, D outputs 1 in this case with probability negligibly close to δ. We conclude from Lemma 1 that δ must be negligible.
Recall that the distance between two vectors Z 1 , Z 2 is exactly wt(Z 1 ⊕ Z 2 ). We show that, conditioned on wt(Z ⊕ Z * ) ≤ u, we have wt(Z ⊕Z) ≤ u with all but negligible probability.
Write Z = Z * ⊕ w for some vector w of weight at most u = ε + n. The vectorZ is generated by the following process: choose an error vector e by setting each position of e (independently) to 1 with probability ε, and then setZ = Z * ⊕ e. We see that the probability thatZ differs from Z in at most u entries is precisely the probability that wt(Z ⊕Z) = wt(w ⊕ e) ≤ u .
The random variable wt(w ⊕ e), where w is fixed, is the sum of n independent indicator random variables, one for each position of the vector w ⊕ e. The expectation of wt(w ⊕ e) is
Since ε ++ is a constant strictly larger than (ε + − 2ε + ε + ε), the Chernoff bound implies that wt(w ⊕ e) ≤ ε ++ n with all but negligible probability.
Security of the HB + Protocol Against Active Attacks
We now prove security of the HB + protocol against active attacks. A standard Chernoff bound shows that the completeness error is exponentially small for the given setting of the parameters. Therefore, we focus only on the security of the protocol against active attacks. As in the previous section, we deal first with the case of ε < ε + < 1/4; in that case, we also assume for simplicity that τ − n = Θ(k). We then extend the proof to handle any ε < 1/2.
The Case ε < 1/4
Claim 5. Say there exists an adversary A interacting with the tag in at most q executions of the HB + protocol (possibly concurrently), running in time t, and achieving
Adv active A,HB + (ε, τ, u, n) = δ
. Then there exists an algorithm D making q · n oracle queries, running in time O(t), and such that
Asymptotically, when ε < ε + < 1 4 , and τ − n = Θ(k), and u = ε + n as in Theorem 4, the final two terms of the above expression are negligible. Thus, the claim together with Lemma 1 proves Theorem 4 in this case. (k + 1)-bit strings (b,z) , proceeds as follows:
Proof. D, given access to an oracle returning
1. D chooses s 2 ∈ {0, 1} τ uniformly at random. 2. D runs the first phase of A. To simulate a basic authentication step, D obtains a sample (b,z) from its oracle and sends b as the initial message. A replies with a challenge a, and then D responds with z =z ⊕ s 2 , a . Note that since D does not rewind A here, there is no difficulty in simulating the n parallel executions of the basic authentication step (nor in simulating concurrent executions of the entire protocol). 3. When A begins the second phase of its attack, it first sends an initial message b 1 , . . . , b n (we now explicitly consider all n parallel iterations of the protocol rather than focusing on a single basic authentication step). In response, D chooses random a 1 1 , . . . , a 1 n ∈ {0, 1} τ , sends these challenges to A, and records A's response z 1 1 , . . . , z 1 n . Then D rewinds A, chooses random a 2 1 , . . . , a 2 n ∈ {0, 1} τ , sends these to A, and records A's response z 2 1 , . . . , z 2 n . 4. Let z
Let us analyze the behavior of D:
Step 2, above, sincez is uniformly distributed and independent of everything else, the answers z that D returns to A are uniformly distributed and independent of everything else. It follows that A's view throughout the entire experiment is independent of the secret s 2 chosen by D.
The {â i } n i=1 are uniformly and independently distributed, and so except with probability at most 2 n 2 τ they are linearly independent (this is a standard combinatorial result that is easy to prove). Assuming this to be the case,Ẑ is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} n from the point of view of A. But then the probability that Z ⊕ andẐ differ in at most 2u entries is exactly 2 −n · 2u i=0 n i . We conclude that D outputs 1 in this case with probability at most
Case 2: Say D's oracle is A s 1 ,ε for randomly chosen s 1 . In this case, D provides a perfect simulation for the first phase of A. Let ω denote all the randomness used to simulate the first phase of A (namely, the keys s 1 , s 2 , the randomness of A, and the randomness used to respond to A's queries). For a fixed such ω, let δ ω denote the probability, over random choice of a 1 , . . . , a n , that A successfully impersonates the honest tag in the second phase. The probability that A successfully responds to both sets of queries a 1 1 , . . . , a 1 n and a 2 1 , . . . , a 2 n sent by D is thus δ 2 ω . The overall probability that A successfully responds to both sets of queries is then given by
using Jensen's inequality (here E ω denotes the expectation over the choice of ω).
Assuming A does respond successfully to both sets of D's challenges, this means that (z 1 1 , . . . , z 1 n ) differs in at most u entries from the correct answer
and also (z 2 1 , . . . , z 2 n ) differs in at most u entries from the correct answer
We conclude that D outputs 1 in this case with probability at least δ 2 . This completes the proof of the claim.
Auxiliary Lemmas
Before turning to the case of ε < 1/2, we state and prove some coding-theoretic results on which we will rely. Throughout 
We now prove a "distributional" form of the Johnson bound, which says that for any distribution over a Hamming ball B ⊂ {0, 1} n of radius αn, two strings chosen independently according to this distribution will be closer than their "worst-case" distance 2αn with reasonably high probability. 
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume the Hamming ball is centered at the origin. Let δ = 1 − 2α + , and let γ = 1 − 2α. Note that γ 2 > δ by hypothesis. Set
We show that for two vectors Δ 1 , Δ 2 chosen independently according to distribution D, we have wt(Δ 1 ⊕ Δ 2 ) < α + n with (constant) probability at least 1 c 2 . Assume not, so that
Then Finally, we show that for a random linear code there is no "small" Hamming ball containing more than a negligible fraction of the codewords. 
Proof. Suppose there is a ball B of radius αn that contains K codewords of C for some arbitrary K. We first show that this implies the existence of a ball B + of slightly larger radius, centered at the origin, that contains at least γ K points of C (for some constant γ ). We then show that, for a random linear code, B + typically captures only an exponentially small (in k) fraction of the codewords of C and so γ K must be small. Assume there is a ball B of radius αn that contains K codewords of C.
, as defined in Lemma 7. We claim that there exists a codeword x * ∈ B such that the ball B(x * , α + n) of radius α + n centered at x * contains at least γ · K codewords. Assume toward a contradiction that no such x * exists. Let D be the uniform distribution over codewords in B. Then for any codeword x ∈ B we have
and so
This contradicts Lemma 7.
Since we are working with a linear code, the number of codewords in B(x * , α + n)
is equal to the number of codewords in B + def = B(0, α + n). We conclude that if there is a ball of radius αn that contains K codewords of C, then there is a ball of radius α + n centered at the origin that contains at least γ · K codewords of C. We now bound the probability that |B + ∩ C| ≥ γ K. Let X be a random variable denoting the number of codewords in B + when the generating matrix A is chosen at random. Let δ r , for r ∈ {0, 1} k \ {0 k }, be the indicator random variable denoting whether Ar ∈ B + , and note that Pr[δ r = 1] = |B + |/2 n = 2 −Θ(n) . Observe also that the {δ r } are pairwise independent. We have X = 1 + r∈{0,1} k \{0 k } δ r , and so (for k sufficiently large) E[X] < 1 + 2 k |B + |/2 n ≤ 1 + 2 ck for some constant c < 1 that depends only on α + . Now, for any γ K > 1 + 2 ck ,
We now prove security of the HB + protocol against active attacks in the general case of ε < 1/2 (and for arbitrary τ, n = Θ(k)). We do not provide concrete bounds in this case, though such bounds may be derived from the proof that follows.
Proof of Theorem 4. Fix a PPT adversary A, and let δ
We construct a PPT adversary D attempting to distinguish whether it is given oracle access to A s,ε or to U k+1 (as in Lemma 1) . Relating the advantage of D to the advantage of A gives the stated result.
The first three steps of our algorithm D are identical to those in the previous proof, and only the last step differs. For convenience we repeat all the steps here. D, given access to an oracle returning (k + 1)-bit strings (b,z), proceeds as follows: Case 1: Say D's oracle is U k+1 . Let A be the n × τ matrix whose rows are theâ i . Viewing s 2 andẐ as column vectors, we see thatẐ = A · s 2 . As in the proof of Claim 5, when D's oracle is U k+1 the adversary A has no information about s 2 and, therefore, from the point of view of the adversaryẐ is a random element in the column space of A. Furthermore, D outputs 1 exactly when Z ⊕ is within distance u ofẐ. We want to argue that this happens with low probability.
Let z
Translating the above to the language of coding theory, A defines a random, linear code C of dimension τ and length n, andẐ is a random codeword in this code. Fixing any Z ⊕ , the probability thatẐ is within distance u ofẐ is exactly |C ∩ B(Z ⊕ , u )|/2 τ . Lemma 8 shows that with all but negligible probability over A, this probability is negligible in τ (and hence negligible in k).
Case 2: Say D's oracle is A s 1 ,ε for randomly chosen s 1 . Exactly as in the proof of Claim 5, we have that A responds correctly to both sets of queries a 1 1 , . . . , a 1 n and a 2 1 , . . . , a 2 n with probability at least δ 2 A . We show next that conditioned on both challenges being answered successfully (and for appropriate choice of ε ++ ), Z ⊕ differs fromẐ in fewer than u entries with constant probability. Putting everything together, we conclude that D outputs 1 in this case with probability Ω(δ 2 A ). It follows from Lemma 1 that δ A must be negligible.
We now prove the above claim regarding the probability that Z ⊕ differs fromẐ in fewer than u entries. Set ε ++ so that (1 − 2ε + ) 2 ) . Fixing all the randomness used in the simulation of the first phase of A defines a function f A from queries a 1 , . . . , a n to vectors (z 1 , . . . , z n ) given by the response function of A in the second phase. Define the function f correct that returns the "correct" answers for a particular query; i.e., f correct (a 1 , . . . , a n ) def = s 1 , b 1 ⊕ s 2 , a 1 , . . . , s 1 , b n ⊕ s 2 , a n   (recall that b 1 , . . . , b n are the vectors sent by A in the first round). Define   Δ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) def = f A (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ⊕ f correct (a 1 , . . . , a n ), and say a query a 1 , . . . , a n is good if wt (Δ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) ≤ u. A query a 1 , . . . , a n is good if A's response is within distance u of the "correct" response, that is, A successfully impersonates the tag in response to such a query.
Let D denote the distribution over Δ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) induced by a uniform choice of a good query a 1 , . . . , a n (we assume at least one good query exists since we are only interested in analyzing this case). To see how this maps on to the reduction being analyzed above, note that conditioning on the event that A successfully responds to queries
So Δ 1 ⊕ Δ 2 = Z ⊕ ⊕Ẑ, and we see that Z ⊕ andẐ differ in fewer than u entries exactly when wt(Δ 1 ⊕ Δ 2 ) < u . Now, by definition of a good query, each vector in the support of D has weight at most u = ε + n. By Lemma 7, with constant probability over Δ 1 , Δ 2 generated independently according to D, we have wt(Δ 1 ⊕ Δ 2 ) < u (note that u and u were chosen to satisfy the conditions of the lemma). This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.
Conclusions and Open Questions
The main technical results of this paper are the first rigorous proofs of (1) security of the HB + protocol against active attacks, even under parallel and concurrent executions; and (2) "hardness amplification" for the HB and HB + protocols as the number of iterations of the basic authentication step increases. Our proofs are also the first to explicitly take into account the non-zero completeness error and the impact this has on the security of the protocol as a whole.
We believe our proofs are remarkably simple, and view this as an additional contribution of this work (rather than as a drawback!). Indeed, we expect there will be further applications of Lemma 1 to the analysis of other cryptographic constructions based on the LPN problem, and hope this paper inspires and aids others in exploring such applications.
It would be very interesting to see an efficient protocol based on the LPN problem that is provably resistant to man-in-the-middle attacks such as those of Gilbert et al. [12] . Though much recent work [5, 9, 13, 14, 33] (subsequent to the results described here) addresses this problem, none of these provides a provably secure solution to the problem in its full generality. It would also be useful to improve the concrete security reductions obtained here, or to propose new protocols with tighter security reductions. As one possible approach toward this goal, one can imagine changing the HB/HB + protocols so that the tag always introduces at most ε · n errors, rather than introducing errors in each of the n iterations with independent probability ε. 7 (A related idea, in a different context, was explored in [3] ; their analysis does not seem to apply to our setting.) This would give protocols with perfect completeness, and would improve the concrete security bounds as well since the upper bound u could be set to exactly ε · n. On the other hand, it is not clear what can be said of the hardness of the natural variant of the LPN problem such protocols would be based on.
